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Abstract
Along with the traditional primitives of economic development (mate-
rial preferences, technology, and endowments), there is a growing interest
in exploring how psychological and sociological factors (e.g., bounded ra-
tionality, norms, or social preferences) also inﬂuence economic decisions,
the evolution of institutions, and outcomes. Simultaneously, a vast liter-
ature has arisen arguing that economic experiments are important tools
in identifying and quantifying the role of institutions, social norms and
preferences on behavior and outcomes. Reﬂecting on our experience con-
ducting experiments in the ﬁeld over more than ﬁve years, we survey the
growing literature at the intersection of these two research areas. Our
review has four components. In the introduction we set the stage identi-
fying a set of behavioral factors that seem to be central for understanding
growth and economic development. We then divide the existing literature
in two piles: standard experiments conducted in developing countries, and
experiments that have been conducted to answer speciﬁc questions about
economic development. We then oﬀer methodological advice concerning
the design of experiments conducted in the ﬁeld and on how to economet-
rically identify sociological factors in experimental data. We conclude by
suggesting topics for future research.
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11 Introduction1
Modern theories of economic development posit interactions where: informa-
tion asymmetries and expectations matter, agents act strategically but may
face cognitive limitations, preferences can involve elements of fairness, altruism
or reciprocity, and social norms constrain choices. Our purpose is to contribute
to this body of literature by showing how economic experiments have been (and
can be) used to measure the reactions of people in developing economies to
these decision-making environments. These experiments are potentially power-
ful because they can test the degree to which institutions matter and whether
institutions have the intended eﬀects.
We focus on decision-making experiments in ﬁeld labs, but the experimental
methodology itself is powerful because it allows researchers to separate con-
founding factors and/or cross-eﬀects, attribute causation, and calibrate policy-
oriented programs for development.2 Armed with these tools, experimenters
have recently left labs on campuses in the developed world and have begun to
pay attention to the local conditions in which experiments are conducted to
understand behavior within diﬀerent economic, political, cultural or ecological
contexts.
Like economists in many other ﬁelds, development economists have been
inﬂuenced by the sudden ﬂood of experimental evidence which has begun to
change the way economists model and understand interactions. We begin by
highlighting pleas by leading development economists to incorporate behavioral
factors into standard models of development. To be more speciﬁc we list a
number of areas in which we feel that experiments would generate valuable
insights for development studies and policies. Based on this list, we review the
small, but growing, literature describing experiments that have been conducted
in developing countries. We sort this literature by purpose. We ﬁrst consider
a large stack of studies in which standard economic experiments have been
conducted in developing countries. These experiments, while interesting, were
usually not conducted to solve any speciﬁc development puzzle. Rather, they
are typically part of cross-national comparisons or have exploited the fact that
small amounts of money provide relatively large incentives for people in poorer
economies.
However, there is a smaller stack of experiments that have been run with
development questions in mind. We spend, relatively, more time on this stack.
We then outline a number of methodological and econometric issues that should
be considered for future work in this area and conclude by making recommen-
dations for future research on the, as of now, unconsidered areas.
1We thank Hans Binswanger, Sam Bowles, Karla Hoﬀ and Duncan Thomas for thought-
ful comments on previous drafts. We also acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of a Research
and Writing grant from the MacArthur Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation’s Norms and
Preferences Working Group, and the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).
Cardenas thanks the International Fellowship program at the Santa Fe Institute, and Natalia
Candelo for keeping the tables up to date.
2For an example of a diﬀerent sort of experiment see the policy intervention of Chattopad-
hyay and Duﬂo (2004).
21.1 On the Behavioral Foundations of Development
Experimental economics may oﬀer methods to test many behavioral hypotheses
at the core of why, after decades of attempts to induce development with inter-
ventions through markets, the state, and self-governance, a few countries have
escaped poverty while others remain desperately poor. How institutions inter-
act with behavioral predispositions and economic decision-making heuristics is
now central to modern theories of development. Bardhan and Udry (1999),
inspired by the wealth of new developments in mainstream economics, explore
theoretical models that incorporate many new aspects of decision-making that
behavioral and new institutional economist are exploring through experiments.
As they argue, [d]evelopment economics is full of examples of apparently irra-
tional behavior that may be successfully explained as an outcome of more com-
plex exercises in rationality, particularly with deeper probes into the nature of
the feasibility constraints or the preference patterns (page 5). These models are
constructed with boundedly rational agents whose preferences are more com-
plex than homo economicus, and who interact within a haze of asymmetric
information, market imperfections, and self-reinforcing mechanisms. Inspired
by experimental results, these models are simultaneously more complicated and
more realistic, but, more importantly, they provide reasonable microfoundations
that help explain economic success, or failure.
Duﬂo (2003), concerned with the overly simplistic “poor but neo-classical”
approach to poverty and development, where agents have unbounded capacity
to gather, remember and process information, argues that poverty itself not
only constrains the poor, it also alters the way they evaluate options and make
decisions. This, in turn, induces the poor to make decisions that are not in
their interest in the long run. Her work using random trials and interventions
to study, for instance, whether farmers adopt new technologies and how poverty
is determining these choices is complementary to the methodological approaches
discussed here. Similarly, Mullainathan and Thaler (2001) discuss arguments
and evidence on how humans’ decisions on savings and consumption do not
follow the standard model of economic behavior, but a pattern of behavior in
which judgment and beliefs override rationality.
Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2001) provide another example of the role that behav-
ioral issues play in rethinking development policy. They write, [S]uppose that
a person who punishes someone for violating a social norm risks confrontation
or revenge but that this risk falls as the proportion of people willing to punish
increases. [...This] may cause the individual to believe that other individuals
will enforce the norm, and the expectation can be self-fulﬁlling.” They go on
to state, [e]nactment of the law can thus "pull in" private activity rather than
"crowding it out" (as occurs in traditional analysis of government provision of
public goods). By extension, a state governed by laws that mirror social norms
(a "rule of law state") tends to be one that is hard to corrupt, whereas a state in
which law is imposed and enforced from above (the "rule of state law") tends to
be costly, ineﬀective, and easily corrupted (page 417). This claim is supported
by recent experimental work which indicates that humans have a propensity to
3punish free riders, even at some personal cost, and that such a trait can induce
cooperative behavior among individuals (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; Carpenter,
2004a; Carpenter and Matthews, 2005). There is even neurological evidence for
this propensity based on economic experiments (de Quervain et al., 2004).
Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2001) go on to summarize their view of the modern the-
ory of development in terms of three broad factors: behavior, institutions, and
“ecology”, the latter referring to a setting where spillover eﬀects among agents
are important. This view overlaps with the Smith (2003) concept of ecological
rationality.3 Hoﬀ and Stiglitz argue that these factors are important for study-
ing development because they highlight the need for changes in existing models.
One primary direction for change is in the application of the economics of in-
formation to the role of institutions in determining or constraining economic
choices, as summarized in Stiglitz (1989) Stiglitz (1989:27) who summarizing
comments that [M]odels focusing on fully informed rational peasants working
within ‘rational’ and eﬃcient institutions are likely to be not only inadequate,
but seriously misleading, just as models that simply hypothesize that peasants are
rule (tradition)-bound, irrational, and non-economic are almost certainly mis-
leading. Peasants are rational, but they are not fully informed. And imperfect
information (as well as a variety of other transaction costs), besides limiting
the eﬀective degree of competition, creates institutional rigidities, allowing the
persistence of seemingly ineﬃcient institutions.
Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2001) also stress that this approach to development means
that externalities play a fundamental role. Externalities may be mediated by
altering a number of proven behavior determinants such as beliefs, information,
search costs, and institutional rules. Because externalities can aﬀect the rewards
achieved by agents in strategic interactions, they can also lead to the existence
of multiple equilibria, including poverty traps. We contend that many of the
factors that regulate the importance of externalities can easily be examined in
the laboratory to measure their eﬀects.
Although economic agents remain rational in most economic theories of de-
velopment, researchers now view human behavior as “socially embedded and
mediated by social relations” (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). Further, these au-
thors draw attention to the “systematic cognitive errors and biases in judgment
(particularly under uncertainty) that arise in individual decision-making” which
can be crucial for the analysis of not only household but also aggregate outcomes
and the policies aimed at improving them. Examples of these cognitive issues in-
clude the recent theoretical developments in hyperbolic discounting inspired by
experimental regularities which change and complicate the standard cost-beneﬁt
calculus of policy making (e.g., Benabou and Tirole, 2003 or Harris and Laib-
son, 2002) or the implications of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000)
3“Ecological rationality uses reason–rational reconstruction–to examine the behavior of
individuals based on their experience and folk knowledge, who are “naive” in their ability
to apply constructivist tools to the decisions they make; to understand the emergent order
in human cultures; to discover the possible intelligence embodied in the rules, norms, and
institutions of our cultural and biological heritage that are created from human interactions
but not by deliberate human design”. Smith (2003): page 470.
4for the compensation of indigenous peoples who tend to lose from development
projects with environmental consequences.
Ray (1998) opens his widely used textbook highlighting several arguments
that in fact are related to a number of the experimental designs we survey below,
including our own. He states, [T]he story of economic underdevelopment is, in
many ways, a story of how informal, imaginative institutions replace the formal
constructs we are accustomed to in industrialized economies. The landlord lends
to his tenant farmer, accepting labor as collateral, but a formal credit market
is missing. Villagers insure each other against idiosyncratic shocks using their
greater information and their ability to impose social sanctions, but a formal
insurance market is missing. Institutions as diverse as tied labor, credit cooper-
atives, and extended families can be seen as responses to market failure of some
sort, precipitated in most cases by missing information or by the inability of the
legal system to swiftly and eﬃciently enforce contracts. What experimental data
has already oﬀered, we argue, is a set of behavioral and psychological regular-
ities on which one can build theories of why these forms of exchange happen
and persist, or why certain institutions and (lack of) information generate the
observed outcomes.
1.2 Speciﬁc Research Areas Amenable to Experimenta-
tion
One need only ﬂip through the pages of the most popular textbooks in devel-
opment economics to get a sense of the areas where, we believe, experimental
economics might oﬀer valuable insights.4 Some areas are part of the core of
development economics, such as the social losses resulting from externalities
and the need for intervention through markets, states, or communities while
other areas include more recent topics in development such as the role of norms
and networks (a.k.a., social capital). With regard to the core issues, the argu-
ments that Smith (1994) oﬀers as reasons for economists, in general, to conduct
experiments apply just as well to the study of development. Experiments are
particularly useful for testing theories and exploring the behavioral determi-
nants of failed theories, for looking at empirical regularities as the basis for new
theories, for comparing environments and institutions, for evaluating policies,
or for designing institutions. These objectives are all fundamental to the study
of development.
Considering more recent themes, the burgeoning literature on the role of
social capital and community governance as an engine for development has
spawned a “retooling” of many standard experiments to measure norms of trust,
fairness, reciprocity and cooperation. Even more recently, these experimental
tools have been used to understand how norms interact with institutions that
are both naturally occurring and artiﬁcially implemented.
To be as speciﬁc as possible, we think that experiments could be applied
4In addition to Ray (1998), see Todaro and Smith (2002), or Chenery and Srinivasan
(1988).
5to the list of issues collected in Table 1. The typology that we oﬀer is just
one possible way of classifying these topics although the list highlights areas
of overlap between standard economic experiments and the recent development
literature. In the left column are important themes emerging in new theories of
economic development, and in the right column we list a set of sub-topics that
are currently being studied experimentally, however mostly in university labs in
developed countries.
A great share of the work we survey here with applications in developing
countries or with development in mind has focused on the ﬁrst two rows of
Table 1 (Preferences & Norms and Social Dilemmas) and to a lesser extent on
a few topics which fall under “Biases, Heuristics & Decision Making.” The last
row in Table 1 represents the co-evolution of institutions and behavior. This
area is particularly ripe because the literature is disperse and not particularly
systematic despite its central relevance.
Despite the research holes associated with Table 1, the studies we have iden-
tiﬁed provide valuable information regarding patterns of behavior in institutions
of social exchange that are central to the problem of development. For exam-
ple, we have found a considerable amount of work examining collective action
and the associated problems of cooperation (speciﬁcally: prisoners’ dilemmas,
voluntary contributions to a public good, and the extraction from a common-
pool resource). In addition, there is now plenty of research on situations where
other-regarding preferences, trust and reciprocity are critical elements in the
likelihood of transactions and the degree of social eﬃciency achieved.
Another potentially rich research area would be applications of existing ex-
periments to the problems of asymmetric information and contracting which
could have applications to the credit, land or labor markets where norms of
reciprocity and gift-exchange may aﬀect the outcomes. The work of Ernst Fehr
is central here, including a recent paper with John List (Fehr and List, 2004)
where the authors recruited Costa Rican CEOs to participate in an experiment
that involved a labor contract which relied on trust and potential retaliation.
2 Standard Experiments Conducted in Devel-
oping Countries
In this section we brieﬂy review the literature on relatively general economic ex-
periments conducted in developing countries to measure the “social preferences”
(e.g., trust, reciprocity, cooperation, fairness), risk preferences and time prefer-
ences of the participants. This contrasts with section 3 in which we highlight
experiments that have been conducted with some particular development issue
in mind. To further organize the review we sort the research by experimental
design, categorizing papers as trust-, cooperation-, and fairness-related games
under the social preferences heading followed by a discussion of risk and time
preference experiments. Tables 2 through 4 contain summary statistics from
m a n yo ft h ep a p e r sw eh a v ed i s c o v e r e d .
6Although we begin by cataloguing experimental research conducted in de-
veloping countries that was not designed to advance economic development,
this does not imply that development economists will not learn something from
these results. We think that, at a minimum, comparing behavioral propensities
across cultures may be particularly interesting when trying to explain the cor-
relation between growth and individual propensities to act prosocially (e.g., the
literature discussed in Durlauf, 2002).5
There has been a large amount of research recording cooperation within
developing countries and comparing this behavior with more developed nations.
Three experiments are typically used in this context: the prisoner’s dilemma, the
voluntary contribution mechanism, and the common pool resource game. Each
game sets up a social dilemma for the participants in which one strategy leads
to the social optimum while the dominant strategy (or best response function)
leads to a socially ineﬃcient outcome. The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is typically
conducted as a symmetric two-person game with two strategies: cooperate and
defect, where defect strictly dominates cooperate. The voluntary contribution
mechanism (VCM) allows players to contribute to a public good, despite the
dominant strategy of free-riding on the contributions of others, and in this way
has the incentive structure of an n-person prisoners’ dilemma. Lastly, in the
common pool resource game (CPR) players cooperate by not extracting too
much from a resource that is accessible to all players but subtractible (i.e., one
player’s extraction reduces the beneﬁts accruing to the others).
2.1 Cooperation
We begin by oﬀering summary statistics from Cooper et al. (1996) as a bench-
mark of PD play in the United States with undergraduates; we then discuss two
examples of work done using the PD to measure social propensities. As one can
see in Table 2, 22% of participants cooperated in the PD in the U.S. Hemesath
and Pomponio (1998) compare the play of Chinese undergraduates with the
play of undergraduates from the United States. Their experiment, like Cooper
et al., uses the strangers treatment in which players are randomly reassigned
new partners at the beginning of each of four rounds and they ﬁnd that Chinese
participants cooperate approximately twice as often as their counterparts in the
U.S.6 The authors conclude that this is evidence that the Chinese are more
cooperatively predisposed. The reason, they state, is that Chinese youth are
socialized diﬀerently than youth in the U.S. In particular, the authors attribute
the high rate of cooperation to the fact that the Chinese are more sheltered
from markets and note that Chinese students studying in the U.S. were less
cooperative than other Chinese students but more cooperative than students
5However, we stress that comparisons across experiments should be guarded due to diﬀer-
ences in procedures and payoﬀs. We say more on this point in section 4.
6Also notice that Hemesath and Pomponio replicate the cooperation rate found by Cooper
et al. in the U.S.
7from the U.S.7
In a diﬀerent “spin” on the prisoners’ dilemma, Tyson et al. (1988) ﬁnd evi-
dence of reverse discrimination among South African participants who are more
cooperative towards black counterparts. As listed in Table 2, participants (half
from each racial category) cooperate 45% of the time with a black confederate
in the repeated PD while only 37% of the time with a white confederate. Corre-
lating play with other factors that suggest motivation, the authors attribute this
behavior to paternalism. While these results are interesting, they are slightly
less compelling because both studies are conducted only with students. The
external validity of the results could be tested by conducting the experiment in
the ﬁeld with participants for whom cooperation is an important dilemma faced
each day.
Through some eyes, the VCM is an improved measure of cooperation be-
cause it allows players to select from a larger strategy set than the PD and
therefore allows participants to choose actions along a ﬁner gradient. In the
standard version of the game players have ten experimental dollars that can
be contributed to the public good or kept. Here our benchmark comes from
Carpenter and Matthews (2002) who report that student players in the U.S.
contribute 42% of their endowments, on average, in a standard 10 round VCM
game, and 64% when players can punish free riders at some material cost to
themselves.8
By comparison, Barr (2001) shows that rural communities in Zimbabwe elicit
overall contribution rates that are similar to those of students in the U.S. A
key diﬀerence in the Barr experiment, however, is that the game is paused
after three repetitions to allow players to criticize each other. Post-criticism,
contributions increase signiﬁcantly and increase highest among players who were
not directly criticized themselves, but witnessed the criticism of other free-riders.
Further, Barr and Kinsey (2002) illustrate that contributing and shaming in this
culture is a gendered phenomenon. Women cooperate slightly more, men attract
more criticism controlling for how badly they free-ride, men are as responsive
as women are to criticism, but women are more eﬀective as critics.9
Carpenter et al. (2004b) use a VCM game in urban slums in Thailand and
Vietnam and report high average contribution rates that actually increase over
7Of course this could just be a selection issue. However, Carpenter (2005) demonstrates
that key elements of markets (repeated interactions and competition) do aﬀect the social
preferences of participants in a bargaining experiment.
8Another important factor in contributions that we will not say much about is the pro-
ductivity of the public good (i.e., how much beneﬁt do contributions generate for the group).
In general, despite the dominant strategy to free ride, as the productivity of the public good
increases, so do contributions (see Ledyard, 1995). The standard measure of the productiv-
ity of the public good is the marginal per capita return from a contribution. In table 2 the
experiments conducted by Abigail Barr had a MPCR of 2/5, and all the others had MPCRs
equal to 1/2.
9The analysis controls for a number of demographic characteristics. The general sense that
non-pecuniary sanctions increase contributions has recently been documented with western
students too. In France and the U.S., Masclet et al. (2003) show that non-monetary sanctions
have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on contributions, despite inﬂicting no material harm on
the target.
8the initial ﬁve rounds of the baseline treatment in both countries. In addition,
like Barr (2001), Carpenter et al. show that a form of social sanctioning further
increases contributions from 72% in Vietnam to 76%, and from 61% to 73% in
Thailand, on average. With reference to the Hemesath and Pomponio (1998) PD
study, Carpenter et al. (2004a) ﬁnd higher initial contribution rates in Vietnam
than in Thailand, which might be due to the collectivist culture advanced by the
governments of China and Vietnam compared to the individualism reinforced
in the United States and Thailand.10
Ensminger (2000) reports playing the VCM (along with the trust, dicta-
tor, and ultimatum games) with the Orma who are nomadic cattle herders in
Northeast Kenya. Participants quickly understood the incentives of the VCM
and nicknamed it ‘harambee’ which refers to contributing to community projects
in Swahili. The overall contribution rate of the Orma was 58% which is on the
high side of the range typically seen in the industrialized West. Ensminger sug-
gests that the high contribution rate might be accounted for by the fact that
sharing among these nomads is institutionalized within tribes and taken very
seriously.
In Eastern Europe, Gaechter et al. (2004) conducted a one-shot VCM in
the ﬁeld with 630 Russian and Byelorussian participants to try to understand
the demographic and sociological determinants of cooperation in these devel-
oping economies. Although their regression analysis turns up little in terms of
demographic correlates, what is interesting is the diﬀerences they ﬁnd between
student and non-student behavior. In a nutshell, students appear to provide
us with the lower bound of trust and cooperation because non-students both
contributed more and had more trusting attitudes.
Henrich and Smith (2004) report similar VCM gamesplayed by the Machiguenga
of the Peruvian part of Amazonia and the Mapuche agriculturalists of southern
Chile. Although the sample sizes are small, the Machiguenga are very uncooper-
ative and the Mapuche appear less cooperative than their neighbors the Huinca
who are descendants of the Spanish colonizers. Henrich and Smith suggest that
this uncooperativeness of the Machiguenga and Mapuche is a reﬂection of their
culture which can be described as fragmented; households are largely indepen-
dent and therefore cooperation among strangers is as uncommon in real life as
it is in the VCM.
Lastly, Karlan (2004) conducts a threshold public goods game with members
of a local credit association in Peru. In this game, players are given a coin that
represents a third of a days wages and allowed to contribute the coin to a public
good. If at least 80% of the people contribute the public good is provided
and everyone is paid two coins. Karlan’s data reveal very high contribution
levels: 81% of people cooperate, but it is not clear that his participants are
more cooperative than participants in other cultures because his experiment is
diﬀerent that the others. Changing the rules by adding a provision point adds
10In fact, Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) show that behavior in market experiments with
very asymmetric equilibrium payoﬀs converges to the competitive equilibrium slower in China
than in the U.S. The authors attribute this result to diﬀerences in competitiveness across the
two cultures.
9equilibria in which there are just enough contributions to provide the public
good.
Finally, ﬁeld work in the CPR game was pioneered in Cardenas et al. (2000)
w h oe x a m i n e dh o wp e o p l ei nC o l o m b i a ,w h oa c t u a l l yf a c ee x t r a c t i o nd e c i s i o n s
on a daily basis, react in the experiment. Extraction levels hover just below
the symmetric Nash equilibrium prediction, indicating that participants extract
slightly less than selﬁsh maximizers should, but not much less than Colombian
students playing a similar game (see Cardenas and Carpenter, 2004). What
is particularly interesting is the fact that after eight rounds, the researchers
change the rules by allowing half the groups to communicate before another
eight rounds, while the other half faced external regulation of their extraction
levels. External regulation works very well early on, but over time regulation
crowds out the other-regardingness of participants and payoﬀs soon fall below
those of the groups who successfully reduce extraction through “cheap talk.”
This result is important because it indicates that external regulators can actually
make CPR situations worse by crowding out evolved prosocial norms that have
already led to eﬀective self-regulating schemes.
In two additional variations on the standard CPR game, Cardenas et al.
(2002) and Cardenas (2003b), Cardenas and his coauthors ﬁnd that induced
asymmetries in the payoﬀ matrices used to model the CPR have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the behavior of rural participants. Those with better outside options
put less pressure on the resource, but still extract more as a fraction of their Nash
extraction level than the relatively poorer participants who have less attractive
outside options. However, as in the ﬁrst CPR game, communication attenuates
the extraction problem even though, in theory, it is cheap talk.
2.2 Trust and Reciprocity
In the Berg et al. (1995) investment or “trust” game (TG), both a ﬁrst-mover
a n das e c o n d - m o v e ra r ea l l o c a t e da na m o u n to fm o n e ya sas h o w - u pf e e .T h i s
amount is typically around ten dollars. The ﬁrst-mover is then given the chance
to send as much of her endowment to an anonymous second-mover as she wishes.
The experimenter triples the amount of money sent before it reaches the second-
mover; hence sending money is potentially socially eﬃcient. The second-mover
is then allowed to send back as much money as he wishes.11
The subgame perfect prediction is straight-forward. The second-mover has
no incentive to send any money back and therefore, realizing this, the ﬁrst-
mover should not invest anything in the partnership. This is a social dilemma,
however, because the players can jointly do much better if money is sent, because
the experimenter triples any transfers. Despite the subgame perfect prediction,
Table 3 shows that Berg et al. (1995) ﬁnd that ﬁrst-movers send an average of
half of their endowment and second-movers return 30% of what they receive, on
11This is how Berg et al. ran the game, but other variations have been seen. For example,
Glaeser et al. (2000) do not give an endowment to the second-mover and double, rather than
triple, the transfer. Bolle (1998) also doubles the transfer, but makes the ﬁrst-mover’s decision
all or nothing.
10average. While this is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the game theoretic prediction,
sending money is still a bad investment for ﬁrst-movers because, on average,
they recover only 90% of what they send. In a replication at an institution
with a signiﬁcantly smaller and more homogenous student population, however,
Burks et al. (2003) ﬁnd that investing pays oﬀ. Students send 65% of their
endowment and return 40% of what they receive which translates into a 31%
return on investment for ﬁrst-movers, on average.
There have been a number of replications of this game with students in
developing and transitioning countries (see Table 3). A few of these studies also
run their own U.S. baseline experiments to control for protocol and experimenter
eﬀects. Ashraf et al. (2003) play a version of the TG with students in the U.S.,
Russia and South Africa. The U.S. replication of Berg et al. results in worse
outcomes from a social eﬃciency point of view. Only 41% of the endowment
is transferred by ﬁrst-movers in the U.S. and only 23% of the amount received
by second-movers is sent back.12 These results are similar to what they ﬁnd in
Russia and South Africa. In each case, it does not appear that trusting pays
oﬀ.
By contrast, Buchan et al. (2003) ﬁnd more trusting behavior among stu-
dents in east Asia. Their U.S. replication generates data that is similar to the
Burks et al. data; however their students are slightly more trustworthy. Out-
side the U.S., the Chinese appear to be the most trusting, sending an average
of 73% of their endowments as ﬁrst-movers. In general, the amount sent (73%
in China, 68% in Japan, 64% in South Korea) exceeds what is seen in many
U.S. experiments.13 The authors have no explanation for the slight diﬀerences
between countries, but do point out that the results are contrary to many of the
current theories about cross-national diﬀerences in trust including Fukuyama
(1995) who believes that the U.S. and Japan have high levels of generalized
trust compared to South Korea and China. Perhaps the more interesting fact is
that trusting pays well in Asia where ﬁrst-movers receive around 50% on their
investments.
In a slightly more exotic location, Holm and Danielson (2005) conduct TGs
in Tanzania with students at the University of Dar es Salaam in addition to
Swedish control experiments. In many respects, this paper is an African and
Swedish replication of Glaeser et al. (2000). The authors conduct a survey of
demographic factors and behavioral factors to correlate with behavior in the TG.
The Tanzanian students send an average of 53% of their endowment, which is
close to the original study of Berg et al. and to their Swedish replication (51%).
In fact, the Swedish and Tanzanian amounts sent are not statistically diﬀerent.
On average, Tanzanian students return 37% of what they receive and Swedes
12This, however, may be the result of having participants play a number of games in addition
to the TG. Burks et al. (2003) show that, with prior knowledge, having players respond to
both roles reduces TG ﬁrst-mover transfers from 65% to 47% and reduces the amount sent
back from 40% to 14%. A number of participants said they felt less responsible for the payoﬀ
of their partner when this person had multiple ways to make money. The authors call this
the “Reduced Responsibility” hypothesis.
13However, only the Chinese send signiﬁcantly more than their U.S. counterparts (p<0.10).
11return 35% which results in a positive expected return for ﬁrst-movers. In
Tanzania they also ﬁnd that none of the survey factors predict behavior in either
role of the experiment. These results run contrary to Glaeser et al. who ﬁnd
that questions about speciﬁc trusting situations and past trusting do predict
behavior. However, the survey does have some predictive power in Sweden.
Speciﬁcally, an index of trusting behavior based on three questions14 predicts
the amount sent and the amount returned, and the standard GSS trust question,
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted/you can’t
be too careful in dealing with people.” predicts how much is sent back. Lastly,
Danielson and Holm show that altruistic behavior in the dictator game predicts
trustworthiness in both locations indicating that ﬁrst-mover behavior in the TG
might be confounded by altruism.
The last two student games we consider are Koford (2001), who conducted
the TG in Bulgaria and Lazzarini et al. (2004) who conduct the TG in Brazil. In
his replication of Berg et al., Koford’s participants send signiﬁcantly more and
reciprocate signiﬁcantly more than in the original paper, but exhibit behavior
that is almost identical to that described above in Burks et al. Students at Soﬁa
University and Varna University behave similarly to students at Middlebury
College. This result (as well as the Russian data from Ashraf et al., 2003 and
Wilson and Bahry, 2002) is interesting given that one might expect low levels of
trust in transition countries because of a history of oppression and/or because
of the vacuum left by the collapsed state.
In Brazil, Lazzarini et al conduct a number of treatments including what they
call a single-blind game in which participants know whom they are paired with,
their double-blind game similar to the standard TG, and an envelope-drop game
in which participants allow the experimenters to place some of their earnings
in a stamped, addressed envelope that they then drop somewhere in town to
see if it will be returned. Considering only the game that resembles the other
experiments we have discussed, ﬁrst-movers transfer 56% of their endowment,
but end up losing 20% of this investment (on average) because second-movers
only return 34% of the doubled amount that they receive.
We also found a number of recent experiments conducted in developing coun-
tries that do not use students as participants. Barr (1999b) and Barr (2003b)
are good examples. Barr visited twenty-four villages in Zimbabwe to play TGs
with two subject populations that have been sorted into two treatments by gov-
ernment policy in the 1980s. The government resettled many villages shortly
after independence was granted in 1982. While the overall level of trust is in
line with many of the other experiments, perhaps the most interesting result
is that trust is higher in the traditional villages than in the resettled villages,
however it is hard to tell whether this is a result of resettlement or selection into
resettled villages by more risk-averse families who trust less.
Moving south, Carter and Castillo (2002) play the TG with 283 villagers in
14“Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful/are mostly looking out for
themselves;” “Do you think that most people try to be fair/take advantage of you if they get
the chance;” “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted/you can’t
be too careful in dealing with people.”
1214 communities in South Africa. They ﬁnd that participants send an average
of 53% of their endowment and receive 38% in return. The implied return
ratio at the average is 1.14, indicating that trusting pays in South Africa. Also
in South Africa, Burns (2004) conducts the TG with high school children to
examine mistrust among ethnic groups. Overall, she ﬁnds very low levels of
trust (33% sent, on average) and trustworthiness (23% returned, on average).
Additionally, her data reveal a systematic pattern of distrust toward back second
movers. Moving north, Danielson and Holm (2003) show that members of a
Tanzanian church send slightly more than the South Africans (56%) and are
more trustworthy returning 46% of what they are sent.
Moving across the border and into the bush, Ensminger (2000) ﬁnds that
Orma herders trust rather little, sending only 44% of their endowment, and are
the least reciprocal people among the sample we found, returning only 18% of
what they receive. Ensminger remarks that this result is puzzling given the fact
that the Orma have strict rules about food sharing. Also in Kenya, in the slums
of Nairobi, Greig and Bohnet (2004) report the lowest level of trust that we
have found. First movers send only 30% of their endowment getting only 41%
of the doubled amount back.15 This translates in to a -18% rate of return, on
average. Our last stop in Africa is Uganda where Mosley and Verschoor (2003)
report the trust behavior of 134 eastern villagers. Like the Orma, these villagers
send slightly less than half their endowment (49%) and return only a third of
the total they receive. As a result, ﬁrst-movers break even, on average.
Karlan (2004) plays the TG (in addition to the provision point VCM) with
people in Ayacucho, Peru. His experiment indicates that Peruvian villagers send
46% of their endowment, which is close to the average of the behavior we have
surveyed, but are on the high side with respect to trustworthiness, sending back
43% of what is received. This result may also be driven by selection because all
the participants are members of a group credit association and therefore might
be more trustworthy than the average citizen (at least one would hope). In any
case, trusting pays in the group; at the average, ﬁrst-movers make 12% on their
investment in less than a few hours.
Elsewhere in Latin America, Castillo and Carter (2003) play the TG with
Honduran villagers. What is noteworthy about this experiment is that the
authors gather a very large sample (n=389), especially considering the game
is played in the ﬁeld where recruitment is usually more diﬃcult. Castillo and
Carter calculate that the average fraction of the endowment (equivalent to two
days wage) sent to the second-mover is 49% and, on average, second-movers send
back 42% which translates into a 26% return on investment for the ﬁrst-movers.
In nearby Paraguay, Schechter (2004) conducts the TG and a risky lottery game
with rural villagers to disentangle trust from risk-taking. As mentioned above,
many have noted that altruists might send money in the TG with no expectation
of getting anything in return, but it might also be the case that thrill seekers
send money in the TG because they enjoy taking risks. In addition to the
TG, Schechter asks participants to bet on the roll of a die in a gamble with
15In this case the amount sent was doubled not tripled before it got to the second party.
13positive expected return (one should expect to earn 25 cents for each dollar
gambled). The more one bets, the more risk-seeking they are. She shows that
risk-taking predicts ﬁrst-mover behavior indicating that part of what is typically
attributed to trust in the TG is actually risk-seeking. Finally, Fehr and List
(2004) recruited 126 undergraduate students and 76 CEOs from the coﬀee agro-
industrial sector in Costa Rica and ﬁnd that the CEOs sent and sent back more
than the student control group.
In rural Bangladesh, Johansson-Stenman et al. (2004) measure trust using
surveys and experiments. In the experiment they ﬁnd that their non-student
participants transfer an average of 46% of their endowment in each direction.
First-movers send 46% to second-movers and second-movers return 46% of the
total they receive, on average. The relatively high amount sent back assures
that most ﬁrst-movers earned money by trusting; the average rate of return
was 38%. When comparing surveyed trust and behavior in the experiment, the
authors ﬁnd that there is a positive association between one’s answer to whether
“most people can be trusted” and the amount that ﬁrst-movers send, but the
association is twice as high when one looks at the relationship between surveyed
trust and trustworthiness in the experiment.
Lastly, Wilson and Bahry (2002) conduct the TG in two remote parts of
Russia, Tartarstan and Sakha, because these regions are characterized by strong
independence movements and therefore may be sites of inter-ethnic unrest be-
tween locals and ethnically Russian settlers. The idea was to use the TG to
measure this unrest. On average, 51% of the endowment was transferred to the
s e c o n d - m o v e r . T h ea m o u n tw a sal i t t l eh i g h e ri nS a k h aa n dal i t t l el o w e ri n
Tartarstan. The average fraction returned was 38%, which means that trusting
should have paid oﬀ for many participants. The nationality of the ﬁrst-mover
does not aﬀect the amount sent, and therefore there is little correlation between
trust and obvious evidence of ethnic diﬀerences.
Figure 1 summarizes our survey of trust game behavior. We separate the
data between student experiments and non-student experiments and graph the
average fraction sent versus the average rate of return for ﬁrst-movers. The
ﬁrst two letters indicate the country in which the experiment was conducted
and the name in parentheses indicates the ﬁrst author of the study. In general,
we see that the collection of studies indicates that there is an upward sloping
relationship between trust and reciprocity suggesting the possibility of multiple
trust-trustworthiness equilibria. At one extreme, the South African students in
the Ashraf et al. study do not send very much as the ﬁrst-mover and return
signiﬁcantly less than what is sent to them as second-movers. At the other
extreme, the South Korean students in the Buchan et al. study send a lot and
send back half of what they receive, on average.
Comparing laboratory experiments with students and ﬁeld experiments with
non-students, one notices that, without the Kenyan outlier, the non-students
seem to demonstrate more trustworthiness. Indeed, the simple regression of the
rate of return on the fraction sent, a student dummy, and the interaction of
the two shows that the student intercept is signiﬁcantly lower (p<0.05) and the
student gradient is steeper (p<0.10). This seems to indicate (as noted in Russia
14by Gaechter et al., 2004) that student trust experiments should been seen as
lower bounds on prosocial behavior.
Perhaps the biggest diﬀerence is between the student data collected by
Ashraf et al. and the non-student data collected by Carter and Castillo which
use nearly identical protocols. In this case, non-students send approximately
10% more and yield approximately 90% more in return. This pattern is re-
peated to a lesser degree in Russia (compare the Ashraf et al. student data
to the Wilson and Bahry non-student data) and Tanzania (compare the two
Danielson and Holm data points). While these diﬀerences seem to suggest that
students tend to be less trusting and less trustworthy than non-students, diﬀer-
ences in protocols could explain part of these diﬀerences, especially when one
considers the variation we see in behavior from U.S. students.
A number of these trust studies (Ashraf et al., 2003; Burns, 2004; Carter
and Castillo, 2002; and Holm and Danielson, 2005) also control for the fact that
in the TG trust may be confounded by altruism. That is, people may send
money in the TG as much because they are altruistic and expect no return
as because they trust the second-mover to share the larger pie. Cox (2004)
oﬀers a clever way to control for the altruism of players in the TG, and each of
these other experiments adopt his methodology to one degree or another. Along
with the standard game, participants also play what is called a Dictator Game
(DG) in which one player, the dictator, is given an amount of money that she
can share with a second player. The game is anonymous, so player one should
feel no direct social pressure to transfer any money and selﬁsh maximizers will
surely not, but altruists will send an amount and the amount will depend on
how altruistic they feel towards player two (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1996 or
Branas-Garza, 2003). Regressing trust and trustworthiness on transfers in the
DG allow us to control for the altruistic intentions of players in the TG.
Ashraf et al. (2003) show that altruism is signiﬁcantly correlated with both
trust and trustworthiness, and that any small diﬀerences that exist between
Russian, American and South African students vanish when one controls for
altruism. Likewise, Carter and Castillo (2002) show that behavior in the DG
predicts both trustor and the trustee behavior, but they also note that because
expectations of what the second-mover will return are also signiﬁcant, altruism
is not the only motive behind sending money.16 In their Honduran data, Castillo
and Carter (2003) do not regress TG decisions on DG decisions but do note that
t r a n s f e r si nt h eD Ga r ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hT Gp l a yi nb o t hr o l e sa tt h e1 0 %l e v e lo r
better. Last, Holm and Danielson (2005) only ﬁnd that dictator choices correlate
with second-mover behavior. Their ﬁrst-movers seem to not be motivated by
altruism.
2.3 Fairness and Altruism
There are two games that have been used to measure fairness norms in diﬀerent
societies. One game, the Dictator Game, was deﬁned in the previous section.
16Ashraf et al. (2003) also ﬁnd this result.
15The second game is the Ultimatum Game or UG. In the Ultimatum Game two
players are provisionally allocated a pie to split. The ﬁrst-mover (proposer)
oﬀers a share to the second-mover (responder) who accepts or rejects the oﬀer.
Accepted propositions are implemented by the experimenter and rejected oﬀers
result in the pie being taken back and both players receiving nothing. Any
division is a Nash equilibrium because a strategy for the responder is a rejection
threshold (i.e., proposers could not deviate down and do better when paired
with a responder who’s lowest acceptable oﬀer is just being met). There is
only one subgame perfect equilibrium, however. No responder will choose a
rejection threshold larger than zero, because she could do better by accepting
lower oﬀers. That is, rejecting is an empty threat. Knowing this, proposers
need not oﬀer more than some small amount. This game has been played
hundreds of times in developed countries and while there is some variation in
behavior across countries (see Roth et al., 1991), most behavior deviates from
the subgame perfect equilibrium in systematic ways. Most proposers oﬀer half
the pie for two reasons: either they are fair-minded or they fear smaller oﬀers
will be rejected, and many responders do, indeed, reject small oﬀers.
Recently the UG and DG have been played at substantial stakes in a number
of places outside the industrialized west. Behavior in the UG and DG is sum-
marized in Table 4. To establish benchmarks however, we will ﬁrst consider the
Carpenter et al. (2005) games run with $100 pies using students and workers
at a Midwestern distribution center as participants. Behavior among students
and workers is similar in the UG but much diﬀerent in the DG. UG oﬀers av-
erage 41% of the pie in the student games and 45% in the worker games while
the rejection rates are 5% among students and 7% among workers. In the DG,
students oﬀer 25% of the pie, on average, while worker behavior is the same as
in the UG; workers oﬀer 45% of the pie in the DG too. Much of this diﬀerence
is attributed to the diﬀerence in social framing between the classroom and the
shop ﬂoor; in this case the workplace seems to elicit more altruistic feelings
between players.
Beginning with the UG, Cameron (1999) conducted experiments with stu-
dents in Indonesia in which the pie was approximately three months average
expenditures. The results are very similar to what we have already seen, on
average, 42% of the pie is oﬀered and the rejection rate was 10%. Using her
own controls, Cameron shows that there is no diﬀerence in proposer behavior
between the low stakes game and the high stakes game, however responders are
sensitive to stakes. Responders are more likely to accept as the stakes increase.
Gowdy et al. (2003) study the behavior of Nigerian villagers in both the UG
and the DG. Their UG data is similar to that found in other areas of Africa
(see below) in that most people oﬀer half and there was only 1 rejection in 73
instances. The authors note that fairness and sharing were the primary motives
stated by the ﬁrst-movers in post experiment debrieﬁngs.
Henrich et al. (2001) summarize the results of an ambitious collection of
UG data from 15 diﬀerent undeveloped societies. For our purposes, it is in-
teresting to note that, using the standard one-shot protocol, variation in ﬁrst
mover behavior only comes from an analysis of very diverse cultures. At one
16extreme, proposer behavior comes closest to the theoretical prediction among
the Machiguenga slash and burn horticulturalists in Peru. Here proposers oﬀer
an average of 26% of the pie and almost no one rejects. At the other extreme,
the Lamelara whale ﬁshermen of Indonesia oﬀer more than half the pie, 58% on
average. Henrich et al. attribute the variation in behavior to two sources: the
payoﬀs to cooperating in the participants’ daily lives and the degree to which
the participants rely on market exchange in their daily lives. Together, these
two variables capture 68% of the variation in proposer behavior. The idea is
that cooperative work norms are measured by proposals such that the relatively
isolated Machiguenga oﬀer little because they are mostly self-suﬃcient while
catching a whale in Indonesia requires team work. Additionally, those popu-
lations that interact frequently with strangers in markets oﬀer more because
they are accustomed to dealing cooperatively with strangers. These results are
important because they link behavior to institutions that are relevant for eco-
nomic development.17 A second round of the 15 small-scale societies project is
currently underway, including a few new sites that provide greater variation in
the degree of integration to the market. The focus of this round is standardized
protocol of Dictator, Ultimatum and Third Party Punishment games.18
A sm e n t i o n e da b o v e ,t h e r ea r et w or e a s o n st ob e“ f a i r ”i nt h eU G .T h e
DG controls for one of these and therefore allows us to focus attention on the
other. Because second-movers in the DG have no say in the distribution of
the pie, they get whatever they are given, dictators need not be fair out of a
fear of having their oﬀers rejected. Hence, the DG measures true “fairness” or
altruism in a population. A number of the experiments already mentioned have
DG components which are interesting on their own.
The student data in Ashraf et al. (2003) look very similar to the student
data in Carpenter et al. (2005) indicating that little cultural diﬀerence in altru-
ism exists between college students in the U.S., Russia, and South Africa. Holm
and Danielson (2005) replicate transfers of about a quarter of the pie using Tan-
zanian students. The procedure in Cardenas and Carpenter (2004) is diﬀerent
because students earn their endowment in a ﬁrst stage CPR experiment and
then are ask to donate any amount to a conservation charity (the protocol is
similar to Eckel and Grossman (1996)). While there are confounds that preclude
comparing the Cardenas and Carpenter data with other DGs (e.g., the possi-
ble endowment eﬀect of earning the money and the fact that the recipient is a
charity), it is interesting to compare Colombian students to American students.
As table 4 illustrates, Colombians donate less than Americans. In addition,
Cardenas and Carpenter ﬁnd that Colombians disproportionately give to a lo-
cal charity and Americans give more to a globally-minded charity, indicating
Colombians focus their altruism locally compared to Americans.
17It is also interesting that the Indonesian students of Cameron’s study were less fair than
the Indonesian ﬁsherman reported in Henrich et al. That is, markets may not be a panacea —
forcing strangers to interact cooperatively may support prosocial sharing and fairness norms,
but competition may also degrade these norms. See Carpenter (2005) for evidence supporting
this view.
18See more at: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/roots-of-sociality.
17It is, however, interesting to compare the Gowdy et al. (2003) study of
Nigerian villagers to the Carpenter et al. (2005) study of distribution center
workers because both protocols include the UG and the DG, the experiments
seem to have been conducted similarly, and the games are played with non-
students. In both cases, the UG distributions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
than the DG distributions indicating that UG proposals in these two circum-
stances are motivated by fairness or altruism and not strategy. Triangulating
this comparison with the Carpenter et al. student data provides us with more
evidence that the behavior we see in the lab with students should be considered
as a lower bound of prosocial tendencies in a population because students tend
to behave more strategically than “normal” people.
The highest DG allocations are found among non-students in South Africa.
Carter and Castillo (2002) ﬁnd average transfers of 42% which is close to the
level seen in Carpenter et al. (2005). In Castillo and Carter (2003), this pair
of researchers reports an average transfer of 42% among villagers in Honduras.
However, this experiment is noticeably diﬀerent from the other DGs because any
money sent to the recipient was tripled, which means the cost of transferring
money for an altruist was a third of what it is in the standard game. Ensminger
(2000) also reports on DGs in Kenya. The average amount transferred to the
recipient here is 31%, which is also larger than within student populations. In-
terestingly, the three DGs conducted with non-students have average allocations
that are considerable higher indicating the relationship between social framing
and generosity might generalize across cultures.
2.4 Risk and Time Preferences
An old fable in the development literature can be paraphrased as follows: peo-
ple in underdeveloped countries are poor partially because they have prefer-
ences that are inconsistent with growth. They have high discount rates and
are risk averse enough so that it is impossible for them to save and take the
risks necessary to begin to accumulate capital. One of the earliest expressions
of this viewpoint comes from Irving Fisher who wrote, [A] small income, other
things being equal, tends to produce a high rate of impatience, partly from the
thought that provision for the present is necessary both for the present itself and
for the future as well, and partly from lack of foresight and self-control Fisher
(1930:73).19 In his innovative ﬁeld study, Binswanger (1980) also noted that
risk preference diﬀerences are important because policy makers can do some-
thing about hindrances to the access of capital, but can do little about the risk
attitudes of those whom capital would help. In this subsection we consider some
of the evidence on this topic and catalogue the experiments that have been done
to measure the risk and time preferences of people in developing countries.
Risk experiments fall into two classes which essentially diﬀer only in the way
that participants register their choices. The top of Table 5 lists the risk aversion
19More recently this fable has been discussed in Lawrance (1991), Moseley (2001), Neilsen
(2001), and Ogaki and Atkeson (1977).
18studies we consider. One class is based on what we call the Accept/Reject
Lotteries experiment. The most important methodological contribution in this
class is Holt and Laury (2002). In this experiment, participants are presented
two columnsof pair-wise lottery choicesand they must accept onelottery per line
and reject the other. Initially, the ﬁrst column dominates the second in terms of
expected payoﬀ and variance in the payoﬀs, but eventually, as the probability
of the high outcome in the second column increases, the expected value of the
second column starts to dominate. This means that the interesting statistic in
this experiment is the point at which participants switch from the ﬁrst column
to the second. A risk neutral person, who only needs to calculate the expected
value of each lottery, will switch after four choices of the ﬁrst column. Those
who are more risk averse will choose the ﬁrst column longer than those who
are more risk seeking. Because this experiment forces participants to choose
between two discrete options, their preferences can only be estimated on an
interval.20 On average, Holt and Laury ﬁnd that student participants exhibit
levels of constant relative risk aversion between 0.68 and 0.97 when they ratchet
up the size of the possible payouts which, in the context of the lotteries oﬀered,
is very risk averse behavior.21
The second class of risk experiments is what we refer to as the Choose Lottery
experiment in which participants are also presented a series of lotteries, but in
this case they are asked to pick one from a list which controls for the probability
of winning a large prize (i.e., they are all determined by the toss of a coin) but
varies the high and low payouts and, in doing so, the expected payoﬀ. Depending
on how risk averse a participant is, he should trade oﬀ expected return for less
variability. Binswanger (1980) was the ﬁrst to conduct this sort of risk analysis
and what is at least as interesting as his protocol is the fact that he conducted his
experiment in rural India with peasant farmers. While, he does hypothesize that
increases in wealth will be associated with lower risk aversion (remember the
fable) this result is not borne out in the regression analysis. For our purposes,
what is interesting is that, despite the diﬀerences in the protocols, Binswanger’s
average estimate of constant relative risk aversion ﬁts within the bounds of the
estimate calculated by Holt and Laury. This comparison does not support the
fable.
However, before we conclude that the risk component of the fable is not
true, we should discuss the other evidence that we have found in the literature.
We start the review by looking for cross-country variation in the risk attitudes
of students within the industrialized world. Jimenez (2003) conducts a slight
variation of the Holt and Laury (2002) experiment with Spanish students. Over-
all, she ﬁnds bounds on the coeﬃcient of risk aversion that are very similar to
the original study conducted in the U.S. (0.40<CRRA<1.25) which strengthens
20Actually, there is one problem with this design. The authors focus on the number of
“safe” or ﬁrst column choices because there are a small but not vanishingly small number of
participants who ﬂip back and forth between columns.
21Holt and Laury (2002) actually vary the stakes of the experiment in a number of treat-
ments but we focus on the results of the highest stakes game because all the ﬁeld studies we
will consider are conducted at relatively high stakes.
19the use of Holt and Laury as a benchmark of the industrialized world. This
experiment is also interesting because Jimenez collects demographic data from
her participants and asks whether the children of olive farmers are more or less
risk averse than other children. This question is important because the fami-
lies which the students come from tend to operate small scale olive farms and
therefore the analysis relates to our fable about peasant farmers being more risk
averse than large corporate farmers. In fact, she ﬁnds no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the two groups of children.
In addition to the Binswanger study, we can discuss two other risk aversion
experiments that were conducted in the developing world. In a two-stage exper-
iment, Barr (2003a) uses the Binswanger protocol to elicit risk attitudes from
villagers in Zimbabwe. In both stages participants choose a risky lottery but the
second stage diﬀers from the ﬁrst because Barr allows participants to pool their
risk by sharing the total gains from the group equally. While it is interesting
that she ﬁnds that when participants have to publicly break their promises to
the group, fewer people join groups but when participants are not allowed to
back out of commitments to their groups, more people join groups, we focus on
the risk measures she gathers in the ﬁrst stage of the game. Barr ﬁnds that the
average level of risk aversion is between 0.32 and 0.81 which matches with the
earlier estimate from India of Binswanger and ﬁts precisely within the estimates
of our two student experiments from industrialized countries.
Neilsen (2001) also conducts a lottery choice risk experiment in the ﬁeld.
Many of his participants are slash and burn horticulturalists from Madagascar.
The participants choose one of six high stakes lotteries (the stakes averaged eight
times the daily wage) with implied CRRA values between 0 and 1. Compared
to the other experiments we have discussed, the participants from Madagascar
exhibit rather low levels of risk aversion (mean CRRA=0.32) but his econometric
analysis indicates that wealthy villagers exhibit more risk aversion and people
w h ol i v ei na r e a sw h e r ed e f o r e s t a t i o ni sp a r t i c u l a r l ye x t r e m ee x h i b i tl e s sr i s k
aversion. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is contrary to most models of concave expected
utility and the author oﬀers no intuition for the second result other than the
fact that his risk aversion measures are strongly correlated with discount rate
data he also collects (see below).
Comparing the risk aversion results from the experiments that are roughly
comparable (Holt and Laury, Binswanger, Barr, Jimenez, and Nielsen) will give
us an idea of whether there are diﬀerences between people in developed countries
and those in developing countries. As one can see, there is not a lot of variation
in the results and where there is variation, it is not explained by development.
In fact, the upper bounds on the Holt and Laury and Jimenez data are larger
than the mean values found in the developing world. Overall, there does not
appear to be much support for the idea that poor people in lower developed
countries are more risk averse than richer people in more developed countries.
Before we conclude our discussion of risk aversion, we point out two other
studies that do not ﬁt neatly into our two categories of risk experiments. First,
Barr and Packard (2000) adopt the Schubert and et al. (1999) method for
measuring the risk preferences of Chilean adults who are either employed or
20are self-employed to determine if the self-employed are less risk averse. In this
experiment participants are presented with a choice between a binary lottery
or a certain payoﬀ. The experimenters would gradually increase the value of
the certain payoﬀ until each participant ﬂipped from the lottery to the certain
payoﬀ to elicit each participant’s certainty equivalent.22 T h o s ep e o p l ew i t h
lower certainty equivalents were more risk averse that those who required more
money to avoid the gamble. The authors ﬁnd that, overall, the self-employed
are not more risk-seeking, but that self-employed contributors to the Chilean
pension system are signiﬁcantly less risk averse than either the people who are
self-employed but do not contribute to the pension system or the people who
contribute but work for someone else.
Second, Schechter (2005) has people in rural Paraguay bet on the roll of
a die to test their attitudes towards risk. There is a one-sixth chance that a
person will lose her entire bet, a one-sixth chance that she will lose half her bet,
a one-sixth chance she will break even, a one-sixth change she will gain 50% on
her bet, a one-sixth chance she will double her bet, and a one-sixth chance she
will increase her bet by two and a half times. Because the expected net return
is positive, risk neutral players should bet their endowments, but the outcome
might not be enough for a suﬃciently risk averse person to bet much. Perhaps
because the protocol is suﬃciently diﬀerent, Schechter ﬁnds rather high levels
of risk aversion (the average CRRA was 2.57). Additionally, she ﬁnds that risk-
seeking is concave in age, that women are more risk averse, but she does not
ﬁnd any relationship between education attainment, wealth or past experiences
with theft and her risk measure. Again, given the correlation between income
and betting behavior is insigniﬁcant, we suspect that the high levels of CRRA
reported in this paper are due to framing or protocol diﬀerences and not due to
the fact that the participants are from the developing world.
The bottom of table 5 lists the experiments on time preferences that we
will consider.23 Even more so that with risk, time preference experiments come
in many shapes and sizes. Not only is it diﬃcult to compare diﬀerent studies
because of slight (or major) diﬀerences in their protocols, there are other is-
sues that confound the comparison of time preference data. First, the reported
discount rates are very sensitive to how interval choices are interpreted. For ex-
ample, most studies use exponential discounting, but Kirby et al. (2002) decide
that hyperbolic discounting is more relevant. Further, even if researchers stick
to exponential discounting, the number of times that interest is assumed to be
compounded per year (obviously) aﬀects the implied discount rate although this
assumption is rarely mentioned. Second, many of these experiments are con-
founded by the credibility of the researcher. In most experiments participants
are paid on the spot, but by their very nature, time preference experiments
must often ask people to wait for their payments. Normally the researchers are
22Henrich and McElreath (2002) also conduct a certainty equivalent ﬁeld experiment in
Chile and Tanzania and ﬁnd values similar to Barr and Packard (2000).
23Our list is not exhaustive. For those interested in a survey of the time preferences liter-
ature that includes methods, surveys, and experiments conducted in developed countries see
Frederick et al. (2002).
21strangers to the participants and therefore, the experimental data may be bi-
ased towards higher discount rates because the participants have two reasons, a
preference for the present and not trusting the experimenter, for choosing a pay-
ment today versus a promised payment in the future. Third, the delays between
payments vary with each study which adds one more factor to be controlled for
in any analysis.
As our developed country benchmarks, we will consider the estimates of
individual discount rates (IDRs) gathered by Coller and Williams (1999) and
Harrison et al. (2002). The nice thing about these estimates is that the experi-
menters have learned from the past and conduct their experiments carefully. For
example, to control (at least partially) for the credibility problem of many ex-
periments, these two papers employ, front end delays which simply means that
there is no promise of money today. Instead, people choose, for example, be-
tween money tomorrow and more money in a week. If participants think there is
some chance that the experimenters will welch on promises to pay in the future,
they should not expect for them to be more likely to welch on a payment one
week from today than on one that is due tomorrow. Because of the asymmetry
of their data, Coller and Williams (1999) report median IDRs between 17% and
20% using student data while Harrison et al. (2002), using data from a large
sample of Danes, report mean overall IDRs that control for many demographic
factors of 28% which should be seen as a lower bound because the mean IDR of
Danish students is 34%.
Along with their risk aversion experiment, Barr and Packard (2000) gather
IDRs using a hypothetical questionnaire. To avoid the problem of interval esti-
mates, Barr and Truman ask participants a series of questions starting with a
baseline tradeoﬀ between an amount now and some future amount that is meant
to get the participant to wait. If the participant does wait, the researcher asks
how much the participant would need to receive now to be indiﬀerent. The mean
IDR reported in this study is 43% which, is in the ballpark of the other esti-
mates. In their fuller analysis, Barr and Truman go on to show that only income
is marginally signiﬁcantly associated with discount rates (p<0.10). Speciﬁcally,
those with larger incomes do appear more patient.
In their experiment, Kirby et al. (2002) go deeper into the ﬁeld than most to
gather data on the time preferences of Tsimane’ horticulturalists of the Bolivian
rainforest. The Tsimane’ are interesting because they have little contact with
western culture and institutions (e.g., credit markets) and therefore allow the
authors to study the time preferences of a group in a more naive setting. Kirby
et al. report median discount rates from their paid experiment of 12% which
seem a little low compared to our other estimates, but this estimate is based
on a hyperbolic discount function, PV = A/(1 + kD) where A is the monetary
prize, k i st h ed i s c o u n tr a t ea n dD is the delay in days. The equivalent inter-
est rate using the more standard exponential discounting (assuming interest is
compounded quarterly) yields an interest rate over 1000%.24 Setting aside this
problem, the authors show that discount rates are correlated with age (posi-
24Furthermore, the lowest exponential discount rate a participant could choose was 14%.
22tively), education (negatively), and income (negatively), but that they are not
correlated signiﬁcantly with wealth which clouds our test of the development
fable more than it sheds light on it.
In addition to collecting risk attitude data on Madagascar, Neilsen (2001)
also collects discount rate data using a mechanism that is similar to his risk ex-
periment in which participants chose a hypothetical trade oﬀ between a current
amount and a future amount. As with the Kirby et al. (2002) experiment, one
problem with the Neilsen options is that the lowest IDR interval is between 0
and 20%. Another problem is that the intervals are so wide that little precision
can be expected. Despite these shortcomings, Neilsen’s data reveal a mean IDR
of 117% which, if taken at face value, indicates that his participants discount
future outcomes very heavily. While this result is hard to accept, looking as
we did with the Kirby et al data at the variance in responses, reveals an in-
teresting fact. Regressing discount rates on demographics, Neilsen ﬁnds that
people who report living in areas in which a lot of deforestation has occurred
have signiﬁcantly higher discount rates.
T h el a s td i s c o u n tr a t ee x p e r i m e n tw ew i l lr e v i e wi st h ec a r e f u ls t u d yo fP e n -
der (1996) who conducts discount rate experiments in the same Indian villages
that Binswanger (1980) conducted his risk aversion study. His experiment is
particularly careful because it included front end delays to control for the cred-
ibility of the experimenters. Pender oﬀered participants eight or ten binary
choices between 10kg of rice now or a larger amount of rice in the future. The
delay is always the same (7 months) but the amount of future rice increases
from 9kg to 20kg. Pender reports that discount rates are somewhat dependent
on the framing of the experiment, but are never below 50% which also indicates
substantial discounting.
Thevalue of time preferencedata is more questionable than theother data we
have considered because protocols are so diﬀerent and the variation in behavior
is so great. In their review of much of the discounting literature that has used
participants from the developing world, Frederick et al. (2002) plot the reported
mean IDRs from 42 diﬀerent experiments (including a few of the ones we have
reviewed) against the date of their publication to make three important points
that resonate in our review. First, the range of elicited discount rates considered
by Frederick et al. is between —6% and inﬁnity and it is between 17% and over
1000% in out review indicating a large role for framing and protocol eﬀects.
Second, there appears to be no convergence in the estimates of discount rates.
According to Frederick et al. the variation in estimates is just as high in 2002
as it was in 1980. Based on this evidence, it would be hard to conclude one way
or another about the existence of diﬀerences in time preferences between people
interacting in economies at diﬀerent stages of development. We return to this
problem in section 4.
233 Experiments Conducted with Development Is-
sues in Mind
In this section we highlight a subset of the papers reviewed in section 2 and a
handful of other papers that did not ﬁt neatly into the categories of section 2.
We have chosen to highlight these papers because the experiments were either
r u nw i t he c o n o m i cd e v e l o p m e n ti s s u e si nm i n do rr u ni nt h eﬁ e l dw i t hp a r t i c -
ipants who face the problems of development on a daily basis. This section is
divided into two sub-sections: In sub-section 3.1 we discuss the use of social
preference experiments as a tool in gathering behavioral data on the social capi-
tal of individuals and communities. In sub-section 3.2 we discuss the importance
for development policy of experiments that are designed to gather information
other than social preferences.
3.1 Social Preferences, Social Capital, and Economic De-
velopment
Clearly, social capital, which we distinguish as either associational social capital
(network connections and their density) or behavioral social capital (norms of
trust, cooperation, and mutual monitoring) has taken hold of the development
literature. For instance the inﬂuential paper of Knack and Keefer (1997) set oﬀ
a debate over the importance of sociological factors in economic development
in addition to the classical economic factors of technology, endowments, and
preferences. At the center of this debate is measurement. As mentioned in
Durlauf (2002), it is hard to get past the hypothetical nature of measures of
behavioral social capital such as the World Values Survey used by Knack and
Keefer. In the ﬁrst part of this section we illustrate the use of social preference
e x p e r i m e n t sa sa na l t e r n a t i v em e a s u r eo fb e h a v i o r a ls o c i a lc a p i t a l . 25
In Barr (2001) and Barr and Kinsey (2002) we learn that villagers in Zim-
babwe understand the problems associated with free riding and are able to con-
trol free-riding through the use of social sanctions and criticism. Those players
who deviate from the group norm by contributing too little are criticized and,
subsequently, contribute more, as do those who simply witness the criticism of
low contributors. However, the data from these experiments also suggest a po-
tential problem. Not only are low contributors sanctioned, in many case those
players who contribute a lot are also criticized. In a sense we see conformity to
some sort of group norm, but the problem is that the norm that evolves does
not maximize group welfare. This sort of “perverse” punishment is endemic
to punishment experiments (see Page and Putterman, 2000 or Carpenter and
Matthews, 2005) and might represent a tendency to conform towards the center
of the strategy space.26 Additionally, Barr demonstrates that men and women
react diﬀerently to the possibility of social sanctions. Speciﬁcally, women are
more responsive to sanctions and better at getting free riders to contribute.
25This argument is more fully developed in Carpenter (2002) and Camerer and Fehr (2004).
26See Carpenter (2004b) for more evidence of conformity in public goods experiments.
24This, argues Barr, has implications for microcredit programs which rely on mu-
tual monitoring at the village level. Her results suggest a reason why programs
targeted at women are more eﬀective.
Barr’s trust game results are also interesting. In Barr (1999a) and Barr
(2003b), the author shows that resettlement has implications for the amount of
trust villagers have in each other. Speciﬁcally, as one might expect, those people
who are resettled into new, larger villages trust their neighbors less than those
who are left in their traditional villages. While the main result is not particularly
surprising and selection might aﬀect the result (i.e., the less trusting may be
more likely to accept resettlement), it is the methodology that is important.
Barr has been able to empirically estimate the eﬀect of resettlement on trust.
We also believe that our work in Cardenas et al. (2000), Cardenas et al.
(2002), Cardenas (2003b), Carpenter et al. (2004b), and Carpenter et al.
(2004a) has relevance for economic development. Our CPR and VCM games
(along with a number of the other studies mentioned above) are relevant be-
cause they take the lab to the ﬁeld and examine how people who face social
dilemmas on a daily basis react to economic incentives. In this sense our exper-
iments are (at least slightly) more externally valid than those conducted with
students at universities. In addition, our CPR games have provided behavioral
evidence that external regulation can crowd out local intrinsic motivation to act
environmentally responsible, and that inequality (both real and induced) can
attenuate cooperative predispositions among people who actually extract from
ac o m m o n s .
Our VCM data have shown that participants from urban slums contribute at
high levels to an experimental public good. These contribution levels are at odds
with what we see from students in the West who typically start contributing at
levels of approximately 50% of the endowment and then contributions decline
over the course of the experiment while our participants contribute at higher
levels initially, and their contributions grow over time (even without the ability
to sanction free riders). Like our CPR results, the observed cooperation in
the VCM suggests that, absent external forces, cooperative norms evolve in
communities that face social dilemmas and policy makers should invest in ways
to foster them rather than in polices that assume cooperation does not exist.
Lastly, we draw attention to three papers because they take, what we think
is, oneof the next stepsin social capitalresearch. Instead of running experiments
only to discover the determinants of behavior, these research projects extend
the use of experiments to gather behavioral data that can be used as inputs
into other analyses. While we have developed this idea more fully elsewhere
(Cardenas and Carpenter, 2005), we think it is important enough to restate
these contributions here.
Henrich et al. (2001) take a small step toward analyzing the association
between cooperative norms (as measured by ﬁrst-mover behavior in the UG)
and the importance of cooperation in production and the inﬂuence of markets
on communities. As part of their analysis of cooperative norms in 15 “small-
scale” societies, the authors regress the average community oﬀer in the UG on
two variables of economic importance that account for 68% of the variation in
25behavior between communities. The ﬁrst variable, the returns to cooperation
in production, is a ranking of which communities rely more on cooperation
in daily production tasks (e.g., compare the Lamelara whale ﬁshermen to the
isolated subsistence horticulturalists, the Machiguenga) and the second variable
is the extent to which a community is inﬂuenced by market activity. While it is
interesting that societies that contribute more are associated with cooperation
being more important in production and being more inﬂuenced by markets, it
may be important to think of the relationships as going in the other direction.
It may be that the establishment of cooperative norms allow markets to take
hold and allow cooperative ventures to occur. This is the sort of causality we
believe would be important to identify if social capital is a valuable concept.
While Henrich et al. (2001) link behavior to economic variables, the great
leap forward comes from designing experiments (or using the appropriate econo-
metric speciﬁcations) that allow one to attribute causation to norms and social
preferences. Karlan (2004) is a good example of designing an experiment to
assure causation runs in the intended direction and Carter and Castillo (2003)
is a good example of disentangling causation using the correct econometric spec-
iﬁcation.
Karlan (2004) records the experimental behavior of members of a group
lending association in Peru and uses this behavior to predict the participant’s
default and savings rate one year later. This time lag gives the author some
leverage in attributing causation to the behavioral social capital captured in his
experimental data. In his analysis, Karlan shows that association members who
are more trustworthy in the TG repay their loans at signiﬁcantly higher rates
one year later and save more voluntarily over the course of the year than people
who are not very trustworthy. This relationship is economically signiﬁcant.
Doubling a second-mover’s trustworthiness (from 25% to 50% returned) reduces
one’s default rate by 7%. At the same time however, he shows that people who
“trust” more in the TG save less and drop out of the credit association more
often, indicating that the trust component of the trust game may actually be a
better measure of risk-seeking than trust. That is, people who send more end
up using borrowed money for more risky ventures and therefore default more
often and have less to save.
Carter and Castillo (2003) adopt a diﬀerent approach to controlling for the
possible endogenous nature of social norms and individual behavior and esti-
mating the eﬀect of trust and trustworthiness on economic outcomes. They use
their data from South African TGs and DGs in two novel applications. First,
they test for the existence of peer eﬀects that constitute social norms using
the methodology of Manski (1993) and second, they examine whether these
norms of altruism, trust and trustworthiness have any economic impact on the
individuals residing in the communities in which they evolve.
From a practical point of view, the Manski (1993) reﬂection problem exists
when researchers try to regress individual group member behavior on, let’s say,
the group average behavior and infer from a signiﬁcant association that the
individual’s actions reﬂect a social norm generated within the group. The prob-
lem is that we can not tell whether the individual’s behavior is inﬂuenced by
26some norm, or whether it simply reﬂects the individual characteristics shared
by all the group members. Put diﬀerently, we might see a correlation between
the group average behavior and individual behavior even if no norm exists be-
cause there is some unobservable that links all the group members in a way that
appears normative, but really isn’t. In our context, an example might be the
diﬀerence between trusting norms that develop among closely linked community
members and the fact that all the experimental participants are members of a
rotating credit association in the community. People in this community might
appear more trusting in an experiment, but in fact the observed trust is either
due to the selection of trusting people into the association or due to the institu-
tional relationship that links the participants and it is not due to the fact that
their interactions have endogenously generated a trusting norm.
In their analysis, Carter and Castillo (2003) use survey responses (that
should be orthogonal to the other institutional factors that determine trustwor-
thy behavior in addition to being orthogonal to the error term) to instrument
group average levels of behavior in the experiment for the 14 communities for
w h i c ht h e yh a v ed a t a . 27 They then show that the predicted group averages sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect individual behavior in all three roles of the experiment (trustor,
returner, and dictator) which is a clean demonstration of the presence of social
norms that aﬀect individual behavior.
Because we can tell plausible stories in which economic outcomes determine
the evolution of social norms just as easily as researchers now discuss the eﬀects
of social capital and norms on economic outcomes, Carter and Castillo have
a second use for their instrumented group average behavior variables (i.e., to
assess the validity of the second link). They show that there are signiﬁcant links
between experimental measures of community norms of altruism and trustwor-
thiness and household per capita expenditures in South Africa. However, these
associations carry the opposite sign of what we might expect given the previous
work of Narayan and Pritchett (1999), for example. They ﬁnd that the more
altruistic (p>0.10) and trustworthy (p<0.05) a participant’s community is, the
lower is this person’s per capita expenditures. Contrary to all the survey-based
studies that come before this one, these paradoxical results suggest that proso-
cial community norms might actually reduce the wellbeing of the community
members.
W h i l ew ed on o tw a n tt od e l v et o om u c hd e e p e ri n t ot h ei m p l i c a t i o n so f
Carter and Castillo’s results, we will oﬀer one thought and stress that the im-
portant part of this paper is the careful statistical methodology that is employed.
These results might simply alert us to the fact that social capital is a messier
business than we ﬁrst thought. While the sociological story in which norms
restrict selﬁsh behavior and the resulting prosocial predispositions allow more
economic transactions to occur is compelling, the fact is that most communities
(like the behaviors in most experiments) are heterogeneous and this heterogene-
ity may muddy the waters.
27One can think of the Henrich et al. (2001) regression mentioned above as a similar
regression.
27For example, suppose equilibria exist in which both trustworthy types and
untrustworthy types are in a group. These polymorphisms could be supported
by the probabilistic punishment of untrustworthy types. If selection occurs over
material payoﬀs, then the two types within any group that is in equilibrium must
have the same payoﬀ. We can assume that these payoﬀs correlate highly with
expenditures. To complete the standard social capital scenario, we can also as-
sume that the group-level equilibria are Pareto-rankable based on the frequency
of trustworthy people. Starting with such a model, one would hypothesize that
the regression of household expenditures on the frequency of trustworthy agents,
ceteris paribus, would yield a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient.
The paradox is that Carter and Castillo ﬁnd that the members of groups
with more trustworthy types actually do worse, not better. There might be
many complications to this standard model that could produce such a result.
For example, our model has not allowed for the fact that, in reality, people
interact both within groups and between groups. There are at least two ways
to incorporate this fact. First, it could be that the interactions that directly
aﬀect material wellbeing, like being employed, occur mostly between groups (or
classes) and in these interactions people behave diﬀerently towards outgroup
members.28 Or, secondly, even if people maintain their types in between group
encounters, groups with more untrustworthy types might do better materially,
by ﬁnding and exploiting groups that are more trustworthy.
Again, there are two “take home” messages from Karlan (2004) and Carter
and Castillo (2003): analyzing the eﬀect of social norms requires one to think
seriously about experimental design and/or econometric methodology to deal
with possible endogeneities and there should be no expectation that using better
tools will make the interpretation of results simpler.
3.2 Risk, Time, and Expectations
Binswanger (1980) points out that at ﬁrst glance it is not obvious whether
people in developing countries are poor because there are constraints on their
access to capital or because they are more risk averse. Either cause could have
the eﬀect of lower investment, accumulation, and growth. Further, institutional
problems may be easier to address than trying to change the risk attitudes of
poor farmers. The same argument applies to time preferences and, indirectly, to
the expectations society holds for diﬀering groups of individuals (e.g., the idea
of a “culture of poverty”). The point is that preferences, norms, and expec-
tations may be harder to change using standard policy tools and may change
much slower than the more traditional view of policy as a tool for changing or
implementing institutions. For this reason alone, it is important to quantify at-
titudes towards time, risk, and each other and test their inﬂuence on economic
performance in the developing world. In this sub-section we highlight a few
papers that deal with risk and time preferences and expectations.
28There is numerous evidence of this including Komorita and Lapworth (1982), Kramer and
Brewer (1984), and Cardenas and Carpenter (2004).
28To continue with Binswanger (1980), the author’s basic results are that
Indian peasant farmer risk attitudes are widely distributed when the stakes of
the gambling experiment are low, but when the stakes are increased to a month’s
labor income, the distribution starts to become more concentrated in the range
of intermediate or moderate aversion to risk. So behavior seems to be sensitive
to stakes, a ﬁnding recently corroborated by Holt and Laury (2002) in the lab
with students. However, the more important implication of the clustering of
risk attitudes at high stakes is that when Binswanger regresses gamble choice on
the personal characteristics of his participants, he ﬁnds no correlation between
wealth or farm size and risk attitudes.
The implication of these results are that one can not explain the variation
in farm performance (i.e., an element of development and growth) by the risk
attitudes of the farmers in charge. While he does not run it, perhaps a more
interesting regression would have been to regress farm performance on an in-
strumented measure of risk attitudes (to break any endogeneity) and measures
of individual and community access to capital (e.g., whether or not a farmer
has borrowed or tried to borrow and the fraction of small scale loans in the
community’s total portfolio). Showing that risk attitudes did not matter while
access to capital did, would be important.
Risk is important for other reasons too. In communities where formal in-
stitutions that provide insurance do not exist, individuals have an incentive to
pool their risk and self-insure against unforeseeable events (e.g., crop failures).
However, while we do know that these arrangements are rare (Townsend, 1994;
Ligon, 1998), we know next to nothing about the behavioral determinants of
joining risk pooling associations. In her brief review of thetheoretical treatments
of risk-sharing, Barr (2003a) identiﬁes two factors that should aﬀect one’s like-
lihood of entering a risk pooling arrangement. For either extrinsic reasons (e.g.,
lack of credible monitoring) or intrinsic reasons (e.g., weak social preferences),
risk sharing arrangements might not evolve because of limited commitment on
part of the potential members. Secondly, theory also predicts that information
asymmetries may hinder risk pooling for the standard moral hazard and adverse
selection reasons.
To test the behavioral implications of these hypotheses, Barr (2003a) runs an
experiment (mentioned above) in Zimbabwe with villagers and compares here
experimental results to more informal survey and interview network data from
people in the same villages. As one might imagine, she ﬁnds in the experiment
that when extrinsic commitment is limited (i.e., people could renege on pooling
agreements once they knew what their payoﬀ would be) and information is
asymmetric (people could renege privately), less risk pooling occurs. Further,
as a nice test of the external validity of her experimental results, Barr also
shows that in three of her ﬁve villages there is a signiﬁcant correlation between
one’s likelihood of pooling risk in the experiment and one’s reported frequency
of giving or receiving assistance from others in one’s village. The results are
interesting because they tell us something that theorists often just assumed
about risk pooling and they show that the behavioral data gathered in the
experiment has some relationship to actual risk pooling activities.
29We brieﬂy revisit the Pender (1996) paper because, although he conducts a
standard time preference experiment, the purpose of his investigation is to test
three prominent models used in the development literature to explain access to
credit. Since all three models require that agents discount future outcomes, his
experimental data is an integral part of the analysis. His results, however, are
not entirely conclusive because he is only able to outright reject a permanent
income model because he ﬁnds individual discount rates that are higher than the
market interest rate. At the same time, the fact that his estimated discount rate
is higher than the prevalent market rate indicates credit market imperfections
which are more in line with both a model of individually upward sloping credit
supply and constrained credit due to imperfect enforcement. As Binswanger
concludes, Pender also states, eﬀectively, that preferences are not the hindrance
to development, institutional problems are.
We conclude this discussion with an example of using experiments to quan-
tify the eﬀects of expectations. Hoﬀ and Pandey (2003) conduct a novel exper-
iment in Uttar Pradesh, India in which grade school children are paid to solve
puzzles. So far this doesn’t sound too interesting, but the twist on this experi-
ment is that there are a number of information treatments that the authors use
to examine the eﬀect of knowing the caste of the other participants on the pro-
ductivity of puzzle solving. These treatments are interesting because, despite
being legislated out of existence in the 1950s, the caste system, in which people
are born into what amount to economic classes, still determines many economic
exchanges. The authors hypothesize that part of the reason class still matters is
because it alters the expectations of people, particularly of those from the lower
classes who often expect that the system is tilted against them.
In their baseline treatment an experimenter announces the name, village,
father, grandfather, and caste of each participant. The idea is that knowing the
caste of the other participants will aﬀect the expectations of success of individual
participants. The authors anticipate that all the participants will perform the
worst in mixed groups because the lower caste participants will expect that
the experiment is tilted in favor of the higher caste participants and the higher
caste individuals will become less attached to the task when interacting with
lower caste members. When caste is not announced, high and low caste children
perform equally well, but when caste is announced, low caste children do much
worse and high caste children perform about the same.
This experiment is much more comprehensive than most. To examine the
performance diﬀerence more fully, Hoﬀ and Pandey explore three possible ex-
planations for the lower performance of the low caste children: expectations
that the experiment is “rigged” against low caste players, loss of self-conﬁdence,
and loss of intrinsic motivation to do well. Children from lower caste might
expect that the world is tilted against them when they interact with high caste
members and this expectation might be present in the experiment as well. To
test for this eﬀect (by controlling for it), the authors introduce a treatment in
which one “winner” is chosen randomly from the group to be paid. Because
this procedure has the appearance of being objective, the authors hypothesize
that low caste players should now do no worse than high caste players. Indeed
30the random winner treatment closes the caste gap in performance such that the
diﬀerence is now insigniﬁcant.29
To test for a loss of self conﬁdence of lower caste members, Hoﬀ and Pandey
introduce a treatment in which participants can choose the skill level of the
puzzles they will try to solve. To keep the incentives straight, everyone earns
more when they solve harder puzzles, but what is telling is if higher caste mem-
bers choose harder puzzles than lower caste members. Self conﬁdence does not
explain the worse performance of the lower castes because there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the skill level chosen by the participants.
Finally, to examine the intrinsic motivation to do well in the experiment,
the authors exacerbate the historical salience of caste by segregating students
by caste. The idea here is that low caste students will feel particularly bad
about themselves when they know that their caste status is what determines the
group they will be in. Indeed segregating the students worsens the performance
of the lower caste participants. However, interestingly, segregation also reduces
the performance of the high caste students. The authors hypothesize that this
reduction in performance may be because high caste students expect that they
are intrinsically worthy of higher rewards despite lower eﬀort just because the
are in the high caste.
No economist views expectations as unimportant, However, expectations are
rarely included in empirical investigations because they are so hard to measure
meaningfully. This experiment is important because it introduces an empirical
methodology that allows researchers to measure the impact of expectations in
a controlled setting in which participants are provided monetary incentives. In
th i sc a s e ,w es e et h a tt h ec a s tes y s t e mi nI n d i am a ys ti l lbet h ec a u s eo fn u m e r o u s
ineﬃciencies because lower caste members reduce eﬀort when they expect to be
discriminated against and higher caste member may lower their eﬀort because
they believe they are owed more just because of the caste they are born into.
4 Methods and a Look to the Future
We conclude by addressing a few methodological issues that have arisen since
experiments have started to be run in developing countries and by pointing
out a few areas that we think are ripe for future research. Our methodological
concerns are mostly design and econometric related. Our view of the future
envisions a number of concurrent large scale projects to study the evolution
of the relationship between social preferences and other behavioral traits of
individuals and communities on one hand and economic performance at the
community level on the other.
29Although it was not done, the authors could have examined this hypothesis even further
by adding the famous locus of control inventory of Rotter (1966) which measures the degree
to which respondents believe life happens to them (external locus of control) or is determined
by them (internal locus of control). It would be interesting to know if lower caste students
are disproportionately externally oriented.
314.1 Methodological Problems and Suggestions
Throughout this survey we have pointed out country-level diﬀerences in be-
havior while cautioning against doing so because of diﬀerences in instructions,
protocols, and experimenters. Indeed, we will make these comparisons again in
the next section. Although there has been a lot of caution about comparability,
we (and their referees) tend to give researchers who conduct experiments in the
ﬁeld a little more leeway because of the logistical problems they face. Implicitly,
a tradeoﬀ has been established in the economic profession between control over
the data generation process and the external validity of the results. Laboratory
experiments are seen as low in external validity but high in control while the
sort of ﬁeld experiments often conducted in developing countries sacriﬁce some
control to gain access to a participant population whose responses are more
externally valid. This trade-oﬀ does not need to exist.
Roth et al. (1991) set the current standard for conducting experiments in
multiple locations; however their attention to detail has not be closely adhered
to. Roth and his coauthors identify three major problems with doing multi-
site experiments: experimenter eﬀects, translations, and currency diﬀerences.
The experimenter eﬀect is simply the observation that the person running a
session may have an eﬀect on the outcome by virtue of how they read the
instructions, answer questions, etc. So, when possible one would like to have
the same person run each session and if this is not possible, one should control
for the experimenter in the analysis (if possible in a way that does not make
the experimenter collinear with the country ﬁxed eﬀects). With respect to the
second problem, the standard procedure for cross-country studies is to have a
standard protocol translated into each language and then back-translated into
the original language to identify any problems with interpretations. Lastly,
paying participants can be diﬃcult because one doesn’t know whether every
session should be conducted at the same stakes or whether the stakes should
be varied so as to maintain purchasing power parity. It appears that the latter
method is perhaps the most common procedure.
All this seems obvious but our ﬁrst methodological point (also discussed in
Ortmann, 2005) is that previous ﬁeld studies in developing countries have been
looser on experimental control than was warranted. The result of this lack of
control is that comparisons that have been made should not have been made
and each data point now stands alone as an isolated island. Most importantly,
other researchers can do little to bridge the islands.
In some cases the experiments have been standardized and there has been
a lot of recent work comparing experimental results across “cultures”, meaning
small samples within a country but not necessarily random samples representa-
tive of the country’s population. First, cultures often transcend national bound-
aries (e.g., Hispanic culture) and there is often considerable cultural diﬀerence
within a country (e.g., China or Russia) so that it can be meaningless to exam-
ine the cultural determinants of behavior by comparing student populations in
diﬀerent countries. For example, we have found data on six trust games played
in the United States (Glaeser et al., 2000; Cox, 2004 and the four in Table 2).
32Comparing the variation in behavior within this sample to the variation between
all the other experiments conducted in a variety of locations in Table 2, we see
that the standard deviation of the fraction of the endowment sent in the U.S.
is 0.14 compared only 0.09 in the non-U.S. sample. There is more behavioral
variation within the U.S. than there is between many diﬀerent countries of the
world. Second, many of these experiments are conducted without much of an
exit survey or the demographic information in the exit survey is often not in-
cluded in the analysis. As a result, the variation in behavior is often attributed
to cultural or national diﬀerences when it can actually be better explained by
the demographic diﬀerences in the participant populations (see Botelho et al.,
2005 or Cardenas, 2003a for examples).
Instead of cross-national research, we anticipate an increase in what might
be called cross-community research. In cross-community research the exper-
imenter identiﬁes an important social phenomenon that varies by community
(e.g., local systems for administering a common pool resource, or ecological con-
ditions) and runs experiments and collects demographics designed to uncover
the behavioral determinants of this variation. The methodological point is that
diﬀerences in student behavior may not be that interesting; when one conducts
experiments across populations one should have a well-formulated hypothesis as
to why diﬀerences in the populations may exist.
We now turn to econometric issues. We have already spoken brieﬂy about
the Manski (1993) reﬂection problem, but two other papers deserve attention
because they are important for the proper estimation of the eﬀect of behav-
ioral propensities on economic performance. Durlauf (2002) points out two
major problems with much of the existing social capital literature: identiﬁca-
tion and exchangeability. Identiﬁcation is the essence of the reﬂection problem,
and therefore has already been discussed, but exchangeability usually manifests
itself as omitted variable bias or a selection problem because the residuals (or
dependent variables) in an equation that solves either or both of these prob-
lems can not be “exchanged” with an equation that suﬀers from one of these
problems. Durlauf’s silver bullet is randomization. Randomization allows the
researcher to be sure that the residuals will not be correlated with either omitted
variables or selection processes because the observations placed in the sample
were chosen randomly. Furthermore, randomization may solve the identiﬁca-
tion/reﬂection problem because it is highly unlikely that individuals with the
same (perhaps unobservable) individual characteristics will wind up in the same
group. This fact mitigates the strength of what Manski refers to as correlated
eﬀects (recall section 3.1).
The literature on the identiﬁcation of endogenous social interactions has re-
cently been advanced by Castillo and Carter (2003) who point out that, while
experiments have made enormous strides in measuring social preferences and
expectations, the econometric sophistication of the analysis of these variable
has lagged behind. Speciﬁcally, without strong assumptions and a lot of demo-
graphic data and variation at the session level within a population, it is diﬃcult
to assign importance to preferences, social interactions, background or context.
The major problem in many cross-population analyses that seek to identify the
33eﬀect of “culture” is that without variation at the session level within a popu-
lation, unobserved correlates prevent the separation of the eﬀects of population
level norms or predispositions from the eﬀect of the group-level manifestation
of individual characteristics. That is, without session-level variation within a
population one cannot separately measure the eﬀect of individual characteristics
(e.g., income, age, education) within a population to separate this eﬀect at the
group level from diﬀerences in the norms or culture of the populations.
4.2 Some Suggestions for Future Research
Interest in the eﬀects of social capital and self-governance on economic outcomes
has grown in the past decade. A more recent development in this ﬁeld is the use
and the call for the use of experiments to control for problems of measurement
and identiﬁcation we have already discussed. The project that we think would
be a major contribution would be a large-scale longitudinal study of social pref-
erences. In fact, a mini version of what we have in mind is currently under
way in Germany. Fehr et al. (2003) have recently ﬁnished the ﬁrst wave of a
survey that incorporates a version of the trust game in which participants play
the game simultaneously, and therefore, allows the collection of a large amount
of observations in the form of a survey. Furthermore, this project is important
because they plan to implement multiple waves of the survey to construct a true
panel of data.30 The project we have in mind is slightly diﬀerent. Although it
would be longitudinal and focus on experimental measures of trust and trust-
worthiness, it would also include controls for risk aversion and altruism (see the
end of section 2.2).
Such a data set would allow economists to revisit the analysis conducted
by Knack and Keefer (1997) in which the authors showed that countries with
higher growth rates also had higher levels of trust measured by the World Val-
ues Survey/GSS trust question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with peo-
ple?” We preview such an analysis using the trust data we have collected.31
Again, although the trust experiments we consider mostly use a fairly standard-
ized protocol, there are diﬀerences, and therefore what follows is only meant to
provoke a more elaborate and properly controlled future research project.
Using information from the World Fact Book (2001) and the World Values
Survey (WVS), we gathered economic data (GPD per capita, GDP growth rate,
30Repeated experiments generate panels of sorts. The problem is that experimenters are
forced to rely on random eﬀects estimators because the individual characteristics do not
change over the course of the experiment. The panel that this project will generate is truly
longitudinal because individual demographics will change from observation to observation.
31Originally, we planned to redo the Knack and Keefer analysis with behavioral measures of
trust. However, after some thought, we realized substituting experimental measures for World
Values Survey measures of trust would not be much of a contribution, given, as mentioned
above, the within country variance in trust measures is probably as large as that in the between
country measures. Until we have a large enough sample of behavioral trust measures and can
solve the other econometric problems discussed by Durlauf and his co-authors, there is little
point in conducting such an analysis.
34percent of the population in poverty, Gini coeﬃcients, and unemployment rates)
and mean responses to the trust question from as many of the eighteen countries
represented in Table 2 as possible. Using this data we tested whether there was
any correlation between our measures of trust and economic performance. The
ﬁrst step was to see if there are any links between the WVS measure of trust
used by Knack and Keefer and the experimental measures of trust. Because the
WVS does not cover six of the countries in the sample, the correlation is based
on only 12 observations. However, the result is encouraging; the correlation is
positive, rho=0.51 and is signiﬁcant at the 10% level indicating that countries
with more trust measured by the WVS also demonstrate more trust (i.e., send
more), on average, in the TG.
The second step is to look for correlations between our experimental mea-
sures of trust and the economic indicators. In addition to plotting the relation-
ship between the average amount sent in the TG and the real growth rate of
GDP (as in Knack and Keefer), Figure 2 also plots the relationship between
the behavioral trust data and the fraction of the population in poverty, the
Gini coeﬃcient as a measure of inequality, and the rate of unemployment.32 In
each case the correlations are signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better. Countries
with higher growth rates are associated with more trust (rho=0.51, p=0.02),
countries with less poverty are associated with more trust (rho=-0.66, p<0.01),
countries in which the division of economic gains is more unequal are associated
with less trust (rho=-0.48, p=0.04), and higher unemployment is associated
with less trust (rho=-0.64, p<0.01). While all these relationships are provoca-
tive, the particularly strong correlation between poverty and trust indicates that
a lot of worthwhile research might be done in this area.
We also think that a similar project focusing on time and risk preferences
would be particularly valuable to development (and environmental) economists
because of the extensive use of cost-beneﬁt analysis to create policy. Finally, we
consider projects of more modest scope to be important. The important criteria
for the assessment of these smaller projects at the community level will be
whether or not there is some hypothesis explaining interesting community level
diﬀerences. We are currently engaged in one of these projects (NSF CAREER
grant 0092953) in which the communities we study are all linked by the fact
that the community members face the incentive problems of social dilemmas on
a daily basis. Some of our participants extract resources from common pools
in Colombia, other extract ﬁsh from Toyama Bay in Japan, and still others
are faced with the collective action problems associated with survival in urban
slums (e.g., clean water and the disposal of solid and biological waste).
There are equally relevant topics in Table 1 that have little attention so far.
For instance, ﬁscal constraints in many non-industrialized countries combined
with growing populations of pensioners may be fertile ground for behavioral
research on self-restraint, observed discounting and endowment eﬀects. Com-
bined with research in the industrialized world, such research could provide the
32There are fewer observations in the unemployment graph because this information is not
reported for Tanzania or Uganda.
35intuition for policy experiments such as the case for a voluntary pension saving
mechanism in the U.S. (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). More generally, the tools
perfected in the lab by experimental economists could enrich the growing work
on random interventions that are increasingly being used by academic and de-
velopment groups in critical areas like gender bias, local governance, education
or agricultural technology transfer (Duﬂo and Kremer, 2003; Chattopadhyay
and Duﬂo, 2004; Banarjee et al., 2003).
Another area with central application to the problem of development relates
to the role of external versus internal regulation in the provision of local public
goods or the collective maintenance of common pool resources. There seems to
b eau n i v e r s a lp a t t e r no fap a r t i a lc o o p e r a t i o ni nm o s tb a s e l i n eC P Re x p e r i -
ments, but rather little is known about the eﬀect that subsidies or pecuniary
fees may have in cooperation rate, particularly when the regulator has limited
capacity of monitoring compliance. Yet this is one of the major issues that
has emerged in the literature concerning local governance, decentralization of
state control and the role of citizen participation. The possibility of crowding
in and crowding out of the intrinsic motivations to cooperate that humans seem
to exhibit in experiments and elsewhere, has received little attention outside of
university laboratories.
In sum, given modern development economics is ripe with behavioral ques-
tions which may matter a lot to the growth in living standards, we feel it is
particularly important to model the actor correctly. To get the actor right, de-
velopment economist should consider spending more time in the ﬁeld conducting
experiments.
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Figure 1 — An Overview of Trust Game Behavior by Country and Subject Population.
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37Table 1 – Modern Development Themes and Experimental Applications 
Development 
themes 




•  Social preferences (altruism, trust, reciprocity, fairness, 
cooperation) 
•  Risk and Time preferences 
•  Intra-household allocation and bargaining 




•  Public Goods Provision and Voluntary Contributions Mechanisms 
•  Common-Pool Resources 
•  Prisoners’ Dilemma, Trust and Third Party Punishment Games 
•  Self-governing institutions 




•  Behavioral effects of Poverty & Inequality 
•  Norms and Poverty 







•  Land, Labor & Credit markets 
•  Gift-exchange in labor and land contracts 
•  Share-cropping and other land arrangements 
 
Biases, Heuristics & 
Decision Making 
 
•  Loss Aversion and endowment effects 
•  Hyperbolic and other non-linear discounting 
•  Risk & Stakes 






•  Institutional determinants of Behavior (e.g., crowding in and out, 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations) 
•  Behavioral determinants of Institutions (e.g., property rights – 
formal versus informal, individual versus collective) 
•  External regulations, self-governance and imperfect monitoring 
 
 
38Table 2 – Cooperation in Developing Countries 
Game Study  Location  Students  Mean  Cooperation 
PD  Cooper et al. (1996)  United States  Yes  22% cooperate 
PD  Hemesath & Pomponio (1998)  United States  Yes  25% cooperate 
   China  Yes  54%  cooperate 
PD  Tyson et al. (1988)  South Africa  Yes  45% cooperate w/black confederate 
      Yes  37% cooperate w/white confederate 
VCM  Carpenter & Matthews (2002)  United States  Yes  42% of endowment, 64%
a 
VCM Barr  (2001)  Zimbabwe  No  48% of endowment, 52%
a 
VCM  Barr & Kinsey (2002)  Zimbabwe  No  53% of endowment - women 
    Zimbabwe  No  48% of endowment - men 
VCM  Carpenter et al. (2004b)  Vietnam  No  72% of endowment, 76%
a 
   Thailand  No  61% of endowment, 73%
a 
VCM  Ensminger (2000)  Kenya  No  58% of endowment 
VCM  Gaechter et al. (2004)  Russia  Yes  44% of endowment 
    Russia  No  52% of endowment 
VCM  Henrich & Smith (2004)  Peru  No  23% of endowment 
    Chile-Mapuche  No  33% of endowment 
    Chile-Huinca  No  58% of endowment 
VCM Karlan  (2004)  Peru  No  81% of endowment
b 
CPR  Cardenas & Carpenter (2004)  United States  Yes  79% of Nash Extraction 
    Colombia  Yes  74% of Nash Extraction 
CPR  Cardenas et al. (2000)  Colombia  No  72% of Nash Extraction 
CPR  Cardenas et al. (2002)  Colombia  No  68% of Nash Extraction, 49%
c 
CPR Cardenas  (2002)  Colombia  No  74% of Nash Extraction, 62%
c 
Notes: 
a Without social sanctions, with social sanctions.  
b This results is from a threshold public goods 
game.  
c Without communication, with communication. 
 
39Table 3 – Trust in Developing Countries 






Berg et al. (1995)  United States  Yes  0.52  0.30  0.90 
Burks et al. (2003)  United States  Yes  0.65  0.40  1.31 
Ashraf et al. (2003)  United States  Yes  0.41  0.23  0.58 
  Russia  Yes 0.49 0.29 0.80 
  South  Africa  Yes 0.43 0.27 0.73 
Barr (1999a; 2003b)  Zimbabwe  No  0.43  0.43  1.28 
Buchan et al. (2003)  United States  Yes  0.65  0.45
a  1.35 
  China  Yes 0.73 0.50
a  1.51 
  Japan  Yes 0.68 0.50
a  1.51 
  South  Korea  Yes 0.64 0.49
a  1.47 
Burns  (2003)  South  Africa  Yes 0.33 0.23 0.70 
Cardenas  (2003a)  Colombia  Yes 0.50 0.41 1.22 
Carter & Castillo (2002)  South Africa  No  0.53  0.38  1.14 
Castillo & Carter (2003)  Honduras  No  0.49  0.42  1.26 
Holm & Danielson (2005)  Tanzania  Yes  0.53  0.37  1.17 
  Sweden  Yes 0.51 0.35 1.05 
Danielson & Holm (2003)  Tanzania  No  0.56  0.46  1.40 
Ensminger  (2000)  Kenya  No 0.44 0.18 0.54 
Fehr & List (2004)  Costa Rica  Yes  0.40  0.32  0.96 
  Costa  Rica No 0.59 0.44 1.32 
Greig and Bohnet (2005)  Kenya  No  0.30  0.41  0.82 
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2004)  Bangladesh  No  0.46  0.46  1.38 
Karlan  (2004)  Peru  No 0.46 0.43 1.12 
Koford  (2001)  Bulgaria  Yes 0.63 0.46 1.34 
Lazzarini et al. (2004)  Brazil  Yes  0.56  0.34  0.80 
Mosley and Verschoor (2003)  Uganda  No  0.49  0.33  0.99 
Schechter  (2004)  Paraguay  No 0.47 0.44 1.31 
Wilson & Bahry (2002)  Russia  No  0.51  0.38  1.15 
Notes: 
a This figure differs from Buchan et al (2003) because they include the second-mover’s 
endowment in the amount of money available to send back. 
 
40Table 4 – Fairness in Developing Countries  









Carpenter et al. (2005)
a  United  States  Yes 0.41 0.05 0.25 
    No  0.45 0.07 0.45 
Ashraf et al. (2003)
a United  States  Yes  -  -  0.24 
 Russia  Yes  -  -  0.26 
 South  Africa  Yes  -  -  0.25 
Burns (2003)  South Africa  Yes  -  -  0.26 
Cameron (1999)
a Indonesia  Yes  0.42  0.10  - 
Cardenas & Carpenter (2004)  United States  Yes  -  -  0.27 
 Colombia  Yes  -  -  0.19 
Carter & Castillo (2002)
a South  Africa No  -  -  0.42 
Castillo & Carter (2003)  Honduras  No  -  -  0.42 
Holm & Danielson (2005)
a Tanzania  Yes  -  -  0.24 
 Sweden  Yes  -  -  0.28 
Ensminger (2000)
a Kenya No 
b 
b 0.31 
Gowdy et al. (2003)
a  Nigeria  No  0.43 0.01 0.42 
Henrich et al. (2001)
a Peru  No  0.26  0.05  - 
  Tanzania – H  No  0.40, 0.27  0.19, 0.28  - 
 Bolivia  No  0.37  0.00  - 
  Ecuador – Q  No  0.27  0.15  - 
 Mongolia  No  0.35,  0.36  0.05, 
c - 
 Chile  No  0.34  0.07  - 
 PNG  No  0.43,  0.38  0.27,  0.40  - 
  Tanzania – S  No  0.41, 0.42  0.25, 0.05  - 
 Zimbabwe  No  0.41,  0.45  0.10,  0.07  - 
  Ecuador – A  No  0.42  0.00  - 
 Kenya  No  0.44  0.04  - 
 Paraguay  No  0.51  0.00  - 
 Indonesia  No  0.58  0.00  - 
Notes: PNG is Papua New Guinea. 
aHigh stakes. 
bReported under Henrich et al (2001). 
cSecond 
rejection rate not reported in the original. Two entries in a cell indicate two different samples in 
the same population. 
 
41Table 5 – Risk and Time Preferences in Developing Countries 
Decision Task  Study  Location  Students  Mean Behavior 
Risk: Accept/Reject Lotteries  Holt & Laury (2002)
b  USA Yes  0.68<CRRA
a<0.97 
Risk : Choose Lottery  Binswanger (1980)
 b  India No  CRRA
a = 0.71
c 
Risk : Choose Lottery  Barr (2003a)
b  Zimbabwe No  0.32<CRRA
a<0.81 
Risk: Certainty Equivalent  Barr & Packard (2000)  Chile  No  CE
d= 0.57 










Risk: Accept/Reject Lotteries  Jimenez (2003)  Spain  Yes  0.40<CRRA
a <1.25 
Risk: Choose Lottery  Nielsen (2001)  Madagascar  No  CRRA
a= 0.32 
Risk: Bet on a die roll  Schechter (2005)  Paraguay  No  CRRA
a= 2.57 
Time: Accept/Reject Delays  Coller & Williams (1999)  USA  Yes  17%<MIDR
f<20% 
Time: Accept/Reject Delays  Harrison et al. (2003)  Denmark  No  IDR
e = 28%
c 
Time: Questionnaire  Barr & Packard (2000)  Chile  No  IDR
e = 43% 
Time: Accept/Reject Delays  Kirby et al. (2002)  Bolivia  No  MHIDR
g= 12% 
Time: Choose Delay  Nielsen (2001)  Madagascar  No  IDR
e= 117% 
Time: Accept/Reject Delays  Pender (1996)  India  No  MIDR>50% 
Notes: 
aCRRA is the measure of constant relative risk aversion. 
bHigh stakes.  
cControlling for demographics. 
dCE is the mean certainty equivalent constructed from individual fixed effects in regressions with eight 
observations per participant that varied the odds of the high and low outcomes. This measure is expressed as 
a fraction of the high payout. 
eIDR is the estimated individual discount rate. 
fColler & Williams report the 
median individual discount rate (MIDR) because their analysis is sensitive to cutoffs and the distribution of 
responses in right-skewed.  
gKirby et al. (2002) report median hyperbolic individual discount rates based on 
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